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The Aftermath of Crawford and Davis:
Deconstructing the Sound of Silence
Kimberly D. Bailey
Abstract: Victims of domestic violence often do not want to testify in
court, and if they do, they often recant and/or testify on behalf of their
batterers. To overcome this challenge in prosecuting these types of cases,
prosecutors have implemented a practice of victimless prosecutions where
the out-of-court statements of victims are used in lieu of their live
testimony in court. This practice has been limited, however, by the
United States Supreme Court cases Crawford v. Washington and
Davis v. Washington, which limit the use of out-of-court testimonial
statements in criminal cases when the defendant has not had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. For this reason, some out-ofcourt statements are no longer admissible in domestic violence trials. In
evaluating how this change should affect the future prosecutions of
domestic violence cases, this Article critiques the practice of victimless
prosecutions from the perspective of the victim. Specifically, this Article
proposes that scholars consider whether victimless prosecutions have been
effective in meeting the goals of victim safety, gender equality, and
autonomy. Drawing upon feminist scholarship and literature on the
legal silencing of subordinate groups, it explores whether victimless
prosecutions may discourage women from speaking, which is an
important act of empowerment. More importantly, because victimless
prosecutions remove victims from the prosecution process, they no longer
interact and engage in a dialogue with the criminal justice system. This
legal silence may allow the legal system to ignore victims and to pursue
its own agenda of successful prosecutions, may limit the criminal justice
system’s ability to get direct input from victims on whether these laws
and policies are effective, and may make victims complicit in their
subordination as women. While this Article acknowledges that
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victimless prosecutions may be appropriate for some victims, given the
potential harm of victim silencing and the fact that Crawford and
Davis will limit the use of victimless prosecutions in at least some cases,
the criminal justice system should evaluate whether there are victims
who can and will testify. Directly addressing some of the reasons that
victims do not testify may limit victim silence, which may be a better
long-term approach to the domestic violence problem.
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark
decision, Crawford v. Washington,1 which changed the landscape of
the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
Crawford held that out-of-court statements that are “testimonial”
cannot be admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted in a
criminal trial unless (1) the declarant is unavailable, and (2) the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.2
After Crawford, it was not clear how this decision might impact
domestic violence prosecutions. Specifically, Crawford foreshadowed
the possible end of what some call victimless prosecutions,3 in which
victims’ statements from 911 calls and police statements are used in
lieu of the victims’ live testimony at trial.
After much anticipation, the United States Supreme Court finally
spoke on this issue in Davis v. Washington.4 Unfortunately, the
language that the Court adopted in Davis did not provide the
definitive answer that prosecutors, defense counsel, and lower courts
anticipated.5 The Court held that out-of-court statements are
nontestimonial when they are “made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. Id. at 68.
3. These types of prosecutions are also sometimes referred to as “evidence based”
prosecutions. See, e.g., National District Attorneys Association, Evidence Based Prosecution of
Domestic Violence Cases, http://www.ndaa.org/education/ndaa/nac_evidence_based_
prosecution_domestive_violence_cases.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
4. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
5. See id. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
the majority’s test in Davis is unpredictable); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle:
Domestic Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2006)
[hereinafter Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle] (arguing that Davis offers little guidance to
lower courts or predictability to litigants).
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meet an ongoing emergency.”6 These statements are testimonial
when “the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecution.”7
After Davis, there is no question that in some circumstances,
victimless prosecutions will no longer be a viable option for
prosecutors of domestic violence cases. Specifically, if lower courts
are true to Crawford, many out-of-court statements should no
longer be admissible in domestic violence trials because the
Crawford opinion expressed a specific animus toward the
government’s involvement in the production of evidence. In
preparation for domestic violence trials, government actors
frequently use many statements that are produced in a sophisticated
manner.
The purpose of this Article is not to provide a critique of the
Davis and Crawford opinions.8 Instead, given the limitation on the
use of victimless prosecutions, this Article attempts to grapple with
how prosecutors should handle domestic violence cases postCrawford and post-Davis. As part of my analysis, I critique the
practice of victimless prosecutions from the perspective of the victim.
Specifically, I invite scholars to consider whether victimless
prosecutions have actually helped domestic violence victims in the
manner that they were originally intended to help them. In addition,
scholars should explore whether these types of prosecutions might
have negative, although unintended, consequences for domestic
violence victims.
Indeed, the term victimless prosecution is itself problematic
because it suggests that there is no victim in this legal process. Of
course, there is a victim, but the victim’s presence, specifically her
voice, is limited. The practice of victimless prosecutions actually
6. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
7. Id.
8. For examples of articles that critique these opinions, see Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic
Violence Cases After Davis: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 759 (2007)
(arguing that Davis is unsatisfactory for both prosecutors and defense lawyers because it still is
not clear which out-of-court statements violate the Confrontation Clause in the domestic
violence context), Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 5, at 5 (criticizing the Court’s
analysis of the Confrontation Clause in the domestic violence context), and Deborah
Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 825–34 (2007) [hereinafter Tuerkheimer,
Exigency] (criticizing the Court’s analysis of the Confrontation Clause in the domestic violence
context).
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arose out of necessity, and I certainly do not want to suggest that
prosecutors or other legal actors in the criminal justice system
actively seek to limit the voice of domestic violence victims. Indeed,
domestic violence victims do not testify for a variety of reasons, many
of which have nothing to do with the criminal justice system or its
actors.9
Yet, the reality is that once the victim’s statement is taken from a
911 call or from a police officer, the prosecutor need not hear from
her again. We do hear a limited form of the victim’s voice at trial,
but victimless prosecutions arguably lead to a practice where the
victim’s voice is not heard throughout most of the prosecution
process, nor is it considered in the development of domestic violence
policy. In addition, when the prosecution of the batterer is not in the
victim’s best interest,10 her wishes may be ignored.
Part I of this Article discusses the history of domestic violence
criminal law and the role that the women’s movement played in the
evolution of the law. Specifically, the issue of domestic violence
became more of a public issue rather than just a private one. By
focusing on this important issue, the women’s movement had two
important goals: (1) to keep women physically, mentally, and
emotionally safe;11 and (2) to attack the legal and political structures
that subordinate women and that allow domestic violence to exist in
the first place. Part I also discusses how this movement led to
aggressive arrest and prosecution policies. These policies ultimately
led to victimless prosecutions, which allowed prosecutors to
aggressively prosecute domestic violence perpetrators without the
testimony of victims, who often do not want to testify.

9. See infra Part I.D.
10. See infra Part I.C.3 (discussing how some experts and scholars argue that mandatory
arrest and prosecution policies may make violence worse for some domestic violence victims).
11. While men can also be victims of domestic violence, eighty-five percent of
victimizations by intimate partners in 2001 were against women. Callie Marie Rennison,
Intimate Partner Violence, 1993–2001, BUREAU JUST. STAT. CRIME DATA BRIEF, Feb. 2003,
at 1, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf. In addition, domestic
violence occurs in both heterosexual and homosexual relationships. Scholars have discussed the
importance of recognizing that domestic violence occurs in circumstances outside of the
woman victim/heterosexual relationship dynamic. See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing
Without Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate
Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582 (1996); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and
Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 520 (1992). While additional dynamics may be explored in future works, this Article
focuses on women victims in heterosexual relationships.
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Part II discusses Crawford and the sophisticated manner in
which statements from 911 calls and police statements are gathered
and preserved for use at domestic violence trials. Based on
Crawford’s specific concern with the involvement of government
actors in the production of evidence, this Part argues that lower
courts should interpret Davis to limit this type of sophisticated
practice.
Part III then argues that while the original intent of victimless
prosecutions may have been to protect women, there is no real
evidence that all women are actually safer when they do not testify
than when they do testify. In light of this lack of evidence, I draw
upon feminist scholarship and literature on the legal silencing of
subordinate groups to query whether a nondiscriminatory use of
victimless prosecutions is effective in realizing the women’s
movement’s original goals of safety, gender equality, and autonomy.
Victimless prosecutions may encourage women to remain silent
when speech is an important act of empowerment in and of itself.
Most obviously, victims are silent because they are not testifying and
speaking out against their batterers. More importantly, because
victimless prosecutions remove victims from the prosecution process,
victims no longer interact and engage in a dialogue with the criminal
justice system.
This legal silence may be problematic for three reasons. First, it
may allow the legal system to ignore victims and to pursue its own
agenda of successful prosecutions when the needs of these victims
should be an important focus of legitimate domestic violence laws
and policies. Second, it may limit the criminal justice system’s ability
to get direct input from victims on whether these laws and policies
are effective. Third, it may make victims complicit with their own
subordination as women.
Part IV of this Article, therefore, argues that given the legal
limitations that Crawford and Davis place on victimless prosecutions
and the possibility that these types of prosecutions might be harmful
for some victims, we should develop ways to directly address the
reasons that women may hesitate to testify. While one response to
Crawford and Davis could be that prosecutors automatically dismiss
most prosecutions because most women recant or refuse to testify,12
12. Tom Lininger conducted surveys that found a substantial drop in domestic violence
prosecutions after Crawford. Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L.
REV. 747, 749–50 (2005). Specifically, he found that during the summer of 2004 half of the
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a better response would be to find more ways to encourage women
to participate in the system. I discuss three key reasons why women
fail to participate: a lack of material resources, a lack of protection
from batterers, and poor interactions with the criminal justice
system. I then use Chicago’s “Target Abuser Call” (“TAC”)
program as a potential model of a program that, at this time, seems
to be successful in encouraging victim participation by addressing
some of these reasons.
I caution, however, that there are two reasons that a systematic
implementation of similar programs will be difficult. First,
jurisdictions are plagued by limited resources. Second, many
domestic violence victims and legal actors may be skeptical that
victims can and will testify. For this reason, legal actors may be
tempted to fit as many statements as possible under Davis’
“nontestimonial” category instead of determining whether a
victimless prosecution is necessary or desirable in a particular case.
To address both of these issues, I apply Dan Kahan’s “gentle
nudges” approach to “sticky norms” and suggest that jurisdictions
might have to implement programs similar to TAC on an
incremental basis by first focusing on a small subset of victims of
high-risk offenders. Kahan has theorized that small changes over
time are the most successful in creating institutional change in the
enforcement of laws by legal actors. Incremental changes also put
less of a burden on jurisdictions that have limited financial resources.
I. THE HISTORY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL LAW PRECRAWFORD
A. Domestic Violence: A Private Matter
Domestic violence is a serious problem in the United States.
Between 2001 and 2005, twenty-two percent of nonfatal violent
crimes against women involved intimate partner violence.13 In
addition, thirty percent of all female murder victims were killed by an
intimate during this time period. It is difficult to know the exact
domestic violence cases set for trial in Dallas County, Texas, were dismissed because of
evidentiary problems. Id. In addition, in a survey of over sixty prosecution offices in California,
Oregon, and Washington, seventy-six percent indicated that their offices were more likely to
drop domestic violence charges when the victims recant or refuse to cooperate post-Crawford.
Id. at 750.
13. SHANNON CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T JUST., INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf.
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figures regarding domestic violence, however, because of the
likelihood of underreporting.14
While domestic violence has always been prevalent in the United
States, this country has not always criminally sanctioned it. By 1920,
wife beating was illegal in all states.15 Yet for several decades, law
enforcement and prosecutors did little to enforce these laws.16 The
criminal legal system treated disputes between a husband and his
wife as a private matter, and if the police did respond to a call, the
typical response was to separate the parties involved and to advise the
boyfriend or spouse to calm down.17
Two important catalysts, however, eventually moved domestic
violence away from the private sphere into the public sphere: the
women’s movement18 and civil lawsuits against cities that failed to
protect battered women.19
B. Domestic Violence: A Move to the Public Domain
Participants in the women’s movement were concerned about
domestic violence for two main reasons. First, they worried about
the emotional, physical, and mental safety of women.20 Second, they
viewed domestic violence as a manifestation of women’s legal and
political subordination both inside and outside of the home.21
Frustrated that the police minimized or ignored domestic violence,
feminists made the crime of domestic violence an important public
issue in the 1960s and 1970s. Specifically, they criticized state

14. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1991).
15. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1857 (1996).
16. Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating As a Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2170–71 (1996).
17. Id.
18. Specifically, members of the movement protested, created shelters where victims
could find refuge, and led educational campaigns designed to change attitudes about domestic
violence. Linda G. Mills, Commentary: Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse & the Violence of
State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 557 (1999); see also Siegel, supra note 16, at 2171.
19. Mills, supra note 18, at 558–59; Siegel, supra note 16, at 2171.
20. Mills, supra note 18, at 557.
21. Hanna, supra note 15, at 1854; see also Schneider, supra note 11, at 527; Siegel,
supra note 16, at 2128–29.
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inaction in curbing the problem of domestic violence and advocated
the reform of institutional responses in the criminal justice system.22
Large civil awards against cities that failed to protect women who
were victims of domestic violence also created a sea of change in the
way that law enforcement reacted to reports of domestic abuse. In
Sorechetti v. City of New York, the New York Court of Appeals
awarded the plaintiff a $2 million judgment.23 In this case, the
plaintiff’s father attacked her with a fork, knife, and screwdriver, and
he tried to dismember her leg with a saw.24 The court found that the
police had a special duty to protect a battered woman and her
daughter and that this duty was breached when the police failed to
investigate a report that the daughter had not returned from a visit
with her father.25
Similarly, Tracy Thurman received $2.9 million dollars after
suing the city of Torrington, Connecticut.26 Thurman’s estranged
husband had been put on probation for smashing the windshield of
her car while she was still in it.27 Yet, even after he repeatedly
violated the terms of his probation and restraining order, the police
failed to arrest him.28 On one particular day, Thurman called the
police after her estranged husband violated his restraining order.29
Before the police officer arrived, however, her husband stabbed her
repeatedly and severely injured her.30 The court found that the police
had violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
by treating violence by male intimates differently from violence
committed by strangers.31

22. Mills, supra note 18, at 557. It is also worth noting that there was a women’s
movement in the 1850s that also advocated against domestic violence and in favor of a
structural remedy against this problem. Siegel, supra note 16, at 2128–29.
23. Sorechetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 1985).
24. Id. at 72–74.
25. Id. at 76–77.
26. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984); Mills, supra
note 18, at 1525–26.
27. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1525.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1525–26.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1527–29.
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C. The Rise of Mandatory Policies

In response to both the women’s movement and civil litigation
against police departments, legislators and prosecutors took
increased action to curb domestic violence on an institutional level.
As discussed below, states adopted mandatory arrest and prosecution
policies. These policies, and their results, however, received mixed
reactions from advocates of domestic violence victims.
1. Mandatory and pro-arrest policies
In an attempt to increase the institutional response of the
criminal justice system, Oregon passed the first mandatory arrest
statute in the country in 1977.32 The statute required police to arrest
a suspect if there was probable cause that he had committed a
misdemeanor domestic violence offense.33 In the early 1980s,
Lawrence Sherman, supported by the National Institute of Justice
(“NIJ”), conducted a study of the Minneapolis Police Department.34
Sherman conducted a field experiment of misdemeanor spousal
abuse with three intervention strategies: arrest, ordering the suspect
away from the scene for twenty-four hours, and trying to restore
order.35 Based on the results from this experiment, Sherman
concluded that arrest was the most effective treatment in reducing
the likelihood of renewed violence.36
As a result, in 1984, the United States Attorney General
recommended that arrest be the standard police response to
domestic violence offenses.37 In 1994, Congress passed the Violence
Against Women Act (“VAWA”), which included a provision
authorizing the Attorney General to make grants available to state
and local governments that implemented mandatory or pro-arrest
programs.38
32. Joan Zorza, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence: Why It May Prove the Best First
Step in Curbing Repeat Abuse, 10 CRIM. JUST. 2, 4 (1995).
33. Id.
34. Richard A. Berk et al., Studies: A Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado Springs Spouse
Abuse Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170, 170–71 (1992).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Hanna, supra note 15, at 1859.
38. 42 U.S.C.S. § 3796hh (LexisNexis 2008). It is also worth noting that VAWA
originally included a civil remedy provision that was intended to provide victims of “gender
motivated violence” a federal civil cause of action against their perpetrators. 42 U.S.C.S. §
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Sherman and other experts now question some of the results of
his original study, however. After Sherman’s initial study in
Minneapolis, he and other experts conducted replication studies that
were funded by the NIJ in six different cities.39 The results from the
experiments in Omaha, Nebraska and Charlotte, North Carolina
suggested that arrest was no more of a deterrent than other types of
police responses.40 The results from the experiment in Milwaukee
suggested that arrest reduced the likelihood of renewed violence for
employed, married, high school graduate, white suspects, but
increased the likelihood of renewed violence for unemployed,
unmarried, high school dropout African-American suspects.41 These
13981 (LexisNexis 2008). The Supreme Court ultimately struck down this provision. United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
39. Berk et al., supra note 34, at 171, 173–74; Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The
Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment,
83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 168 (1992). Joan Zorza has criticized the validity of the
replication studies, however, arguing that none of them fully replicated the original
Minneapolis study or each other; each study had its own definition of a domestic relationship,
and the type of police responses used in each study differed. Zorza, supra note 32, at 4–5.
Critics of the NIJ studies also argue that it is incorrect to assume that renewed violence is a
retaliatory response to arrest when the NIJ studies showed fewer reoffenses in the short term,
and those treating batterers believe any retaliation from arrest would happen shortly after
arrest. Frisch, Commentaries: Research that Succeeds, Policies that Fail, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 209, 213 (1992); Zorza, supra note 32, at 8; see also Cynthia Grant Bowman,
The Arrest Experiments: A Feminist Critique, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 201, 204 (1992)
(arguing that the lower recidivism rate for employed men may be because their partners do not
report future violence out of fear of sacrificing their lifestyle and status); Donna Coker, Crime
Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 801, 856 (2001) (citing a study that reviewed the NIJ arrest study data in Milwaukee and
concluded that residence in the most marginalized neighborhoods is a stronger predictor of
increased violence following arrest than unemployment status). But see Emily J. Sack, Battered
Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
1657, 1678 (stating that more recent analysis of the NIJ replication studies shows that there is
a reduction in recidivism among domestic violence offenders who are arrested).
40. Berk et al., supra note 34, at 171–72; J. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchinson, III,
Female Spouse Abuse and the Police Response: The Charlotte, North Carolina Experiment, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73, 115 (1992).
41. Sherman et al., supra note 39, at 168; see also Berk et al., supra note 34, at 173–74.
In the end, only five of the six replication studies were completed. Christopher D. Maxwell,
Joel H. Garner & Jeffrey A. Fagan, The Effects of Arrest on Intimate Partner Violence: New
Evidence from the Spouse Assault Replication Program, NAT’L INST. JUST. RESEARCH BRIEF,
July 2001, at 9, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/188199.pdf (reanalyzing
data from the replication studies and concluding that there is “good evidence of a consistent
and direct, though modest, deterrent effect of arrest on aggression by males against their
female intimate partners”). Ultimately, “the published results from the five replication
experiments produced inconsistent findings about whether arrest deters intimate partner
violence.” Id. at 1.
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replication studies have also been criticized.42 Nevertheless, all fifty
states now allow warrantless arrests in cases where there is probable
cause of a misdemeanor domestic violence offense,43 and most states
have enacted preferential or mandatory arrest statutes.44
2. No-drop prosecution policies
Similar to the lax response of police departments before
mandatory policies, prosecutors often dismissed cases upon the belief
that domestic violence was a private matter or that the victims would
eventually drop the charges on their own.45 Once mandatory arrest
policies became more prevalent, however, the police and prosecutors
believed that arresting perpetrators of domestic violence would be
meaningless unless these individuals were aggressively prosecuted. As
a result, no-drop prosecution policies naturally followed mandatory
arrest policies.46
No-drop policies require prosecutors to prosecute domestic
violence cases regardless of the victim’s wishes.47 “Soft” no-drop
policies allow victims to make the choice to drop charges under
certain specified conditions such as watching a video on domestic
42. Joan Zorza has criticized the validity of the replication studies, arguing that none of
them fully replicated the original Minneapolis study or each other, each study had its own
definition of a domestic relationship, and the type of police responses used in each study
differed. Zorza, supra note 32, at 5–6. Critics of the NIJ studies also argue that it is incorrect
to assume that renewed violence is a retaliatory response to arrest when the NIJ studies showed
fewer reoffenses in the short term, and those treating batterers believe any retaliation from
arrest would happen shortly after arrest. Frisch, supra note 39, at 213; Zorza, supra note 32, at
8; see also Bowman, supra note 39, at 204 (arguing that the lower recidivism rate for employed
men may be because their partners do not report future violence out of fear of sacrificing their
lifestyle and status); Coker, supra note 39, at 856 (citing study that reviewed the NIJ arrest
study data in Milwaukee and that concluded that residence in the most marginalized
neighborhoods is a stronger predictor of increased violence following arrest than
unemployment status). But see Sack, supra note 39, at 1678 (stating that more recent reanalysis
of the NIJ replication studies shows that there is a reduction in recidivism among domestic
violence offenders who are arrested).
43. Prior to 1984, most police officers could not arrest a suspect without a warrant
unless the misdemeanor was committed in the officer’s presence. Officers could arrest a suspect
without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that a felony had been committed.
Hanna, supra note 15, at 1859.
44. Id. at 1859–60.
45. Laurence Busching, Exploring the Future of the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its
Past: Rethinking Strategies for Prosecution of Domestic Violence in the Wake of Crawford, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 391, 392 (2005).
46. Mills, supra note 18, at 561.
47. Id.
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violence, speaking to a counselor, or appearing before a judge to
explain reasons for wanting to drop the charges.48 “Hard” no-drop
policies require prosecutors to proceed with a case regardless of the
victim’s wishes if there is enough evidence to go forward to trial.49
Sometimes hard no-drop jurisdictions will even sanction or arrest
victims who refuse to voluntarily participate in the prosecution.50
Most jurisdictions with no-drop policies, however, do not force
victims to participate in the prosecution.51
3. Responses to mandatory policies
Advocates of domestic violence victims have had mixed reactions
to mandatory policies. Some commentators, such as Cheryl Hanna,
are in favor of mandatory prosecutions, arguing that the choice to
prosecute must be taken away from victims if prosecutors are serious
about sending a clear message that domestic violence is criminally
unacceptable.52 In addition, Hanna argues that allowing women to
choose will give batterers an incentive to intimidate women into not
testifying.53 Hanna also believes that lax prosecution will decrease
police officers’ confidence in the value of arrest and will undermine
their diligence in policing domestic violence.54
Furthermore, Hanna argues that batterers are not just a threat to
their partners, but they are also a threat to society.55 She refers to
research that suggests that violent offenders in a family are more
likely to assault nonfamily members.56 She also notes that batterers
will continue to be abusive to future partners and that mandatory
policies protect children from violence.57
Other commentators, such as Linda Mills, argue that mandatory
policies contain many of the emotionally abusive elements of a
victim’s relationship with a batterer because mandatory policies do
not consider the woman’s personal perspective and circumstances.58
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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Id. at 1889.
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Mills argues, “[W]e should be charged with hearing her story on her
terms and in ways that take into account her particular
circumstances. Only after we attend to this clinical task should we
consider the larger feminist interest.”59 In support, Mills refers to the
replica study conducted by Lawrence Sherman in 1992 that
suggested that violence may increase after the arrest of unemployed,
unmarried, high school dropout African-Americans, and argues that
mandatory policies might actually increase the level of violence
certain women experience.60
Others have noted other potential risks under mandatory
policies. First, there has been some evidence of an increase in dual
arrests during which victims are arrested along with the perpetrator
because the police claim that they cannot determine who was the
aggressor in the attack.61 Donna Coker notes that women who are
arrested risk losing custody of their children, may be barred for life
from receiving welfare benefits, and may have student financial aid
compromised.62 She also notes that arrests of immigrant women also
have disastrous effects because, not having proper legal counsel, they
often plea bargain in order to avoid jail time, which can result in
deportation.63 Coker thus argues that mandatory policies might deter
these women from seeking help from police at all.64
Regardless of the possible shortcomings of mandatory polices,
however, it seems clear that they created a tangible shift in the
criminal justice system’s response to domestic violence.65 Specifically,
59. Id. at 569.
60. Id. at 565–68; see also Coker, supra note 39, at 820 (arguing that more research is
needed to determine how arrest policies specifically affect poor women, women of color, and
immigrant women).
61. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1171, 1184–86 (2002) (noting that many statutes have “primary aggressor” language
that required the police to determine who was the most significant aggressor). But see David
Hirschel et al., Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws: To What Extent Do They
Influence Police Arrest Decisions?, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255, 296 (2007) (finding
that overall dual arrest rates are low in domestic violence cases, but also noting that there are
considerable variations in dual arrest rates both among and within states).
62. Coker, supra note 39, at 830.
63. Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and
Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1048–49 (2000).
64. Id.
65. Indeed, between 1993 and 2001, the number of incidents of nonfatal intimate
violence against women in the United States decreased by half. Myrna Raeder, Remember the
Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 311, 326 (2005). Whether mandatory policies effected this decrease remains
to be seen, but Myrna Raeder cautions that some of this decrease may be illusory and that the
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the criminal justice system now treats domestic violence as more of a
public issue, not a private one.
D. The Use of Out-of-Court Statements
One of the impediments prosecutors face in trying to implement
no-drop prosecution policies is the fact that many victims of
domestic violence do not want to testify in court, and if they do,
they often recant or testify on behalf of their batterers.66 Prosecutors
estimate that approximately eighty percent of domestic violence
victims are uncooperative.67 The reasons for this non-cooperation
may include financial dependence, fear, poor interactions with actors
in the criminal justice system, low self-esteem, and sympathy for the
assailant.68 As a result, during trial, prosecutors often use the out-ofcourt statements of these victims, instead of their live testimony.69
Two United States Supreme Court cases made the use of out-ofcourt statements at trial possible: Ohio v. Roberts70 and White v.
Illinois.71 In Roberts, the state offered a transcript of a witness’s
testimony from a preliminary hearing as evidence at trial.72 Roberts
objected and argued that the admission violated the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.73 The Supreme Court
determined that in order for out-of-court statements to be
admissible under the restrictions of the Confrontation Clause, the
prosecution usually must either produce the declarant or
demonstrate the declarant’s unavailability.74 The Court determined
that even if the prosecution can show that the witness is unavailable,
the prosecution must also show that the evidence bears “indicia of
reliability.”75 The Court stated that when evidence falls within a
“one-size-fits-all” approach of mandatory policies “clearly disadvantaged some women,
disempowered others and did not uniformly lead to lesser risks of violence.” Id. at 330.
66. Lininger, supra note 12, at 751.
67. Id.
68. Id.; see also David Jaros, The Lessons of People v. Moscat: Confronting Judicial Bias in
Domestic Violence Cases Interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 995,
1002 (2005); infra Part IV.
69. Lininger, supra note 12, at 751–52.
70. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
71. 502 U.S. 346 (1991).
72. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59.
73. Id. at 59.
74. Id. at 65. The Court noted that unavailability is not required when the utility of
confrontation is remote. Id. at 65 n.7.
75. Id. at 65.
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firmly rooted hearsay exception or when there is a showing of
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” reliability can be
inferred.76 In Roberts, the Court determined that the witness was
unavailable.77 In addition, the Court held that the preliminary
hearing transcript bore sufficient “indicia of reliability” for
Confrontation Clause purposes because (1) the defendant had
adequate opportunity to cross examine the witness during the
preliminary hearing and (2) his counsel availed himself of his
opportunity to do so.78
In White, the Court was asked to determine whether the
Confrontation Clause required the prosecution to produce a
declarant or to show the declarant’s unavailability before introducing
testimony under the “spontaneous declaration” and “medical
examination” hearsay exceptions.79 Noting that aspects of
spontaneous declarations and statements made during medical
diagnosis could not be recaptured during in-court testimony and
that there was a threat of losing the evidentiary value of these
statements during in-court testimony, the Court refused to extend
the unavailability requirement to these types of statements.80
Although the specific issue of whether spontaneous declarations
and medical diagnosis statements were “firmly rooted” hearsay
exceptions for Confrontation Clause purposes was not before the
Court in White, prosecutors and lower courts inferred from that
decision that they were. As a result, prosecutors began to rely on the
use of these types of hearsay statements to prove their cases in
domestic violence cases.81
At first glance, the use of these out-of-court statements in lieu of
live testimony seems to be a proper solution to the problem of
reluctant domestic violence witnesses. When allowed to utilize such
statements, prosecutors are no longer faced with the dilemma of
having to choose to either drop cases against batterers or force
victims to testify. If prosecutors drop cases, batterers get away with
their crimes. Moreover, by dropping cases, prosecutors arguably

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 66.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 73–75.
See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 348–49 (1991).
Id. at 354–57.
Lininger, supra note 12, at 771.
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allow batterers to control the prosecution process; all batterers have
to do is threaten their victims, and the charges will be dropped.82
Equally problematic is the practice of forcing victims to testify
against their will. If one of the purposes of prosecuting batterers is to
limit the amount of violence that women experience, we certainly do
not want to put women at risk of retaliatory violence by forcing
them to testify. In addition, it seems cruel to threaten these women
with the prospect of imprisonment if they refuse to testify when they
have already been victimized in their homes.
Arguably, the use of out-of-court statements in domestic
violence cases simultaneously allows prosecutors to prosecute
batterers, to keep victims safe from retaliatory violence, and to lessen
the burdens on women to testify. Part II, however, explains how the
Crawford and Davis opinions probably limit the feasibility of this
practice in many domestic violence cases.
II. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON, DAVIS V. WASHINGTON AND
THEIR AFTERMATH
A. Crawford v. Washington
Although prosecutors partially relied on White in introducing the
out-of-court statements of domestic violence victims at trial, Justice
Thomas’ concurrence in that opinion, to which Justice Scalia joined,
began to express some doubt regarding the path that the Court’s
jurisprudence took with respect to the Confrontation Clause.83
Specifically, Justice Thomas expressed concern that the Court had
unnecessarily “complicated and confused the relationship between
the constitutional right of confrontation and the hearsay rules of
evidence.”84 He suggested that the Court interpret the
Confrontation Clause in a way that was more “faithful to both the
provision’s text and history.”85 Justice Thomas’ concurrence,
therefore, seemed to foreshadow part of Justice Scalia’s analysis in
Crawford v. Washington.
In Crawford, police arrested Crawford for the stabbing death of
Kenneth Lee.86 After providing Miranda warnings, police questioned
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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Crawford and his wife twice. Crawford ultimately confessed that he
and his wife went to look for Lee after Crawford learned that Lee
had allegedly attempted to rape Crawford’s wife Sylvia. After the
Crawfords found Lee in his apartment, a fight ensued, Lee was
stabbed in the torso, and Crawford’s hand was cut.87 During his
account of the fight, Crawford stated that he believed that Lee had
something in his hand, Crawford grabbed for it, and Crawford’s
hand got cut.88 Crawford’s wife’s statements to the police during her
interrogation, however, were arguably different with respect to
whether Lee had a weapon.89
Crawford was charged with assault and attempted murder.90 At
trial, Crawford claimed self-defense, and his wife did not testify
because of a state marital privilege.91 Because this privilege did not
extend to out-of-court statements admissible under a hearsay
exception, the state introduced Crawford’s wife’s police
interrogation as a statement against penal interest.92 Crawford
objected on the ground that the introduction of this statement
violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.93 Applying
Roberts, the trial court admitted the statement, finding that it had a
87. Id.
88. Id. at 38–39.
89. During her interrogation, Sylvia stated the following:
Q: Did Kenny do anything to fight back from this assault?
A: (pausing) I know he reached into his pocket . . . or somethin’ . . . I don’t know
what.
Q: After he was stabbed?
A: He saw Michael coming up. He lifted his hand . . . his chest open, he might
[have] went to go strike his hand out or something and then (inaudible).
Q: Okay, you, you gotta speak up.
A: Okay, he lifted his hand over his head maybe to strike Michael’s hand down or
something and then he put his hands in his . . . put his right hand in his right pocket
. . . took a step back . . . Michael proceeded to stab him . . . then his hands were like
. . . how do you explain this . . . open arms . . . with his hands open and he fell
down . . . and we ran (describing subject holding hands open, palms toward
assailant).
Q: Okay, when he’s standing there with his open hands, you’re talking about
Kenny, correct?
A: Yeah, after, after the fact, yes.
Q: Did you see anything in hands at that point?
A: (pausing) um um (no).
Id. at 39–40.
90. Id. at 40.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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“particularized guarantee[] of trustworthiness.”94 The Washington
Court of Appeals, however, reversed and applied a nine-factor test to
determine that the statement was not trustworthy.95 The Washington
Supreme Court reinstated the conviction after determining that
Crawford’s wife’s statement bore guarantees of trustworthiness
because it was “virtually identical” to Crawford’s statement.96
The United States Supreme Court held that the admission of his
wife’s statement was a violation of Crawford’s confrontation rights.97
Justice Scalia, writing the majority opinion, rejected the reliability
test in Roberts, performed a historical analysis of the Confrontation
Clause,98 and introduced a new rule: when an out-of-court statement
is “testimonial,” the Sixth Amendment requires that it cannot be
introduced at a criminal trial unless the declarant is unavailable and
the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant.99
Justice Scalia noted that although the right of confrontation
dates back to Roman times, the founding generation’s source of the
concept was the common law.100 He contrasted the English common
law practice of live in-court testimony subject to adversarial testing
and the continental civil law practice of private examination by
judicial officers.101 Justice Scalia pointed out, however, that English
courts sometimes adopted this civil law practice. The “bail a
94. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). Specifically, the trial court
found the statement trustworthy because Sylvia was not shifting blame, but was corroborating
her husband’s story that he was acting in self-defense. Id. In addition, the trial court
determined that Sylvia had direct knowledge of the events, was describing recent events, and
“was being questioned by a ‘neutral’ law enforcement officer.” Id.
95. Id. at 41. Some facts that the Court of Appeals relied upon in its determination that
the statement was not trustworthy were that the statement contradicted one that Sylvia had
already given, it was made in response to specific questions, and at one point, Sylvia admitted
that she had shut her eyes during the stabbing. Id. Furthermore, the court rejected the state’s
argument that Sylvia and Michael’s statements “interlocked” given the fact that they differed
on an issue critical to Michael’s self-defense claim. Id.
96. Id. (quoting Washington v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663 (Wash. 2002), rev’d, 541
U.S. 36 (2004) ).
97. Id. at 68.
98. For critiques regarding the accuracy of Scalia’s version of legal history, see generally
Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know and When Did They Know It? Fictional
Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005); Roger W. Kirst, Does
Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35
(2005).
99. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
100. Id. at 43.
101. Id.
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committal statutes,” two statutes passed during Queen Mary’s reign
in the Sixteenth Century, made it a routine practice for justices of
the peace and other officials to examine suspects and witnesses
before trial and to read these examinations at trial in lieu of live
testimony.102 Justice Scalia expressed doubt as to whether the
original purpose of the justice of the peace examinations was to
produce evidence admissible at trial, but noted that that was the
ultimate result.103
Justice Scalia determined that this history “supports two
inferences about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.”104 “First,
the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was
the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of
ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”105 Second,
testimonial statements are not admissible if the witness does not
appear at trial “unless he [is] unavailable . . . and the defendant [has]
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”106
Justice Scalia determined that “[s]tatements taken by police
officers in the course of [an] interrogation[] are . . . testimonial . . .
.”107 He reasoned that “[p]olice interrogations bear a striking
resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace,” who had both
investigatory and prosecutorial functions.108 Justice Scalia stated that
“[t]he involvement of government officers in the production of
testimonial evidence presents the same risk whether the officers are
police or justices of the peace.”109 Justice Scalia then explained that
he was using the term “interrogation” in its colloquial sense, but his
definition included any statement “knowingly given in response to
structured police questioning.”110 Later in the opinion, Justice Scalia
stated, “[i]nvolvement of government officers in the production of
testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for
prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time and again throughout a
history with which the Framers were keenly familiar.”111
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 49–51.
Id. at 53–54.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 56 n.7.
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Justice Scalia left “for another day,” however, a complete
definition of “testimonial,” but stated that “it applies at a minimum
to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at
a formal trial and to police interrogations.”112 Chief Justice
Rehnquist predicted in his concurrence, however, that this lack of
definition would create uncertainty in future criminal trials.113 His
prediction was correct, particularly with respect to domestic violence
cases.114
B. State v. Davis and Hammon v. State
After all of the confusion in the lower courts after Crawford, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on two paradigmatic domestic
violence cases to determine whether 911 calls and police statements
can be admitted as evidence under the Confrontation Clause. In
Hammon v. State, two officers arrived at the Hammon home in
response to a reported domestic disturbance.115 When the officers
arrived at the scene, the alleged victim, Hammon’s wife, was sitting
on the front porch.116 The police asked her whether there was a
problem, and she responded, “No . . . .”117
After obtaining permission from Hammon’s wife to enter the
house, the officers found a broken gas-heating unit with fragments
of glass on the floor and flames emerging from the unit.118 Hammon
was in the kitchen.119 In response to the officers’ inquiry, he stated
that there had been an argument, the argument never became
physical, and everything was now fine.120 One officer remained in the
kitchen while the other went outside to Hammon’s wife.121
112. Id. at 68.
113. See id. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
114. After Crawford, some courts categorically decided that excited utterances or
spontaneous statements can never be testimonial. See, e.g., People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d
875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004); People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 772 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004). The majority of courts opted to apply a case-by-case approach to determine whether
911 calls and police statements are testimonial. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 811
(Minn. 2005), vacated, 548 U.S. 923 (2006).
115. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 446–47 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 446–47.
118. Id. at 447.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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The second officer approached Hammon’s wife and asked her
again what had happened.122 He later testified that she said that she
and her husband had gotten into an argument, her husband had
broken many things, and her husband had gotten physical with her,
including pushing her into the ground and shoving her face in the
heater glass.123 Hammon’s wife then, at the officer’s request, filled
out a battery affidavit and included her allegations of abuse.124
The state charged Hammon with domestic battery and violation
of probation.125 His wife was not present for the hearing, but the
trial court admitted her statements to the police as an excited
utterance, and the court admitted her affidavit as a statement of
present sense impression.126 Hammon was convicted.127 His wife
wrote a letter to the court with respect to Hammon’s sentencing and
stated that she wanted him to receive counseling and to attend
Alcoholics Anonymous.128 She also requested that the court place
Hammon on probation so that he could continue to work and help
the family financially and so that he could continue to help with the
care of the children.129 Hammon’s wife claimed that she did not feel
threatened by Hammon’s presence; she just wanted him to get help
with his drinking.130 The court sentenced Hammon to one year in
jail, with all but twenty days suspended.131 Applying Crawford, the
state court of appeals affirmed the conviction.132 The Supreme Court
of Indiana determined that the oral statements Hammon’s wife made
to the police were admissible,133 but rejected the court of appeals’
determination that a statement that qualifies as an excited utterance
is necessarily non-testimonial.134

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The trial court’s determination was made pre-Crawford.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 448 n.3.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 447.
132. Id. at 448.
133. In contrast, the court determined that Amy’s affidavit was testimonial and
inadmissible, although its admission by the lower court was harmless error. Id. at 458.
134. Id. at 453.
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In State v. Davis, Michelle McCottry called 911 and then hung
up.135 The 911 operator called McCottry back, and McCottry
informed her, “He’s here jumpin’ on me again.”136 The operator
then asked to whom McCottry was referring, what his relationship
was to McCottry, and whether the alleged perpetrator had been
drinking.137 McCottry identified her ex-boyfriend, Davis, as the
perpetrator, accused him of beating her, and stated that Davis had
left the scene and that she had a protective order against him.138
Police officers arrived at McCottry’s home shortly thereafter and
noted that she was upset and that she had fresh injuries on her
forearm and face.139
The police officers were the state’s only witnesses at trial.140
McCottry did not testify.141 Because the officers could not testify
regarding the cause of McCottry’s injuries, the only evidence linking
the injuries to Davis were the statements from McCottry’s 911
call.142 The tape was admitted as an excited utterance, despite the
defendant’s Confrontation Clause objection.143 Davis was found
guilty.144 Applying Roberts, the state court of appeals affirmed the
guilty verdict, determining that the trial court properly classified the
call as an excited utterance, a firmly rooted hearsay exception.145
Applying Crawford and using a case-by-case analysis, the
Washington Supreme Court determined that while portions of
McCottry’s 911 call may have been testimonial, the portion
identifying Davis as the perpetrator was non-testimonial and,
therefore, had been properly admitted.146
The facts in both Hammon and Davis are extremely compelling.
Without knowing the whole story, one could interpret Hammon as a
case involving a woman who is involved in a violent relationship, but
135. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 846 (Wash. 2005), aff’d, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 846.
138. Id. at 846–47.
139. Id. at 847.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. This decision took place pre-Crawford.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 851. The court further stated that any error in admitting the testimonial
portions of the 911 call were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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who is afraid to involve the authorities in her situation. Part of her
fear may be that her husband will subject her to further violence.
Part of her may also fear that her family will become destitute should
her husband go to jail.147 Regardless of the reason, Hammon’s wife
may have initially felt reticent to tell the police about the abuse, and,
having finally made a statement, she may later have refused to testify
at trial because she was nervous about the possible consequences for
herself and her family. The reality is that many women feel trapped
in violent relationships because they fear for their physical safety and
because they have limited economic resources.148
One could interpret Davis, on the other hand, as the common
story of the woman who does try to leave, but who is continually
harassed by her batterer. Although she went through the steps of
obtaining a protective order, her ex-boyfriend ignored it and
subjected her to further violence.149 Out of fear of further physical
repercussions, she packed up her things and fled the jurisdiction,
unable to help prosecutors.150 This scenario rings true for many
women trying to escape the dangers of a violent relationship.151
The compelling nature of these stories explains why courts are
reluctant to exclude out-of-court statements that seem essential to
prosecuting domestic violence perpetrators. Yet despite this
understandable reaction, Davis v. Washington limited the use of
these statements in future domestic violence cases.152
As in Crawford, Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
Although Crawford stated that police interrogations are testimonial,
the Court in Davis intended to determine “more precisely which
police interrogations produce testimony.”153 First, the Court
determined that the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial
statements.154 The Court then held that “[s]tatements are
147. See Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 448 n.3 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis
v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
148. See infra Part IV.
149. See Davis, 111 P.3d at 846–47.
150. See Brief of Petitioner at 8, State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, No. 05-5224 (Wash.
2005), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 202.
151. See infra Part IV.
152. Davis, 547 U.S. 813. Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444, was included in this
decision.
153. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
154. Id. at 825–26. Specifically, the Court was not aware of any early American case that
involved the Confrontation Clause and testimonial evidence was not involved. Id. at 824. It
also noted that with the exception of White v. Illinois, cases applying Roberts “never in practice
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nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose
of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency.”155 In contrast, statements are testimonial when “the
circumstances indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency and
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”156
Applying this test to the facts, the Court determined that
McCottry’s identification of Davis was nontestimonial.157 Justice
Scalia stated, “A 911 call . . . and at least the initial interrogation
conducted in connection with a 911 call, is ordinarily not designed
primarily to ‘establish or prove’ some past fact, but to describe
current circumstances requiring police assistance.”158 He determined
that rather than describing past events, McCottry spoke about events
as they occurred.159 In addition, he noted that she called for help
against a “bona fide physical threat” and that the “nature of what
was asked and answered” objectively showed that the statements
elicited were necessary to resolve an ongoing emergency, not to learn
about past events.160 McCottry’s tone was frantic, and Justice Scalia
stated that Davis’ identity was necessary to help the police determine
whether they were dealing with a violent felon.161 Thus, Justice Scalia
determined that unlike Sylvia Crawford’s ex parte statements, which
“aligned perfectly with their courtroom analogues . . . [n]o ‘witness’
goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help.”162
In contrast, Justice Scalia determined that in Hammon it was
clear from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of an
investigation into possible criminal conduct.163 He found that the
interrogation took place in somewhat formal circumstances that bore

dispensed with the Confrontation Clause requirements of unavailability and prior crossexamination in cases that involved testimonial hearsay.” Id.
155. Id. at 822.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 819.
158. Id. at 827.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 828. Justice Scalia noted that a statement can start off as a cry for help and
then become testimonial. For example, after Davis left the scene, McCottry’s statements
arguably became testimonial. Id. at 828–29.
163. Id. at 829.
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“striking resemblance” to civil law ex parte examinations.164
Specifically, the police officer questioned Amy Hammon in a separate
room, away from her husband who tried to intervene in the
conversation.165 In addition, Amy recounted past events, and her
statement took place sometime after the events in question.166 In
other words, as far as Justice Scalia was concerned, her statement was
a substitute for live testimony.167 For these reasons, her statements
were testimonial.168
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in Davis and
dissented from the Court’s resolution of Hammon on the ground
that neither involved the type of evidence that was historically
targeted by the Confrontation Clause.169 Specifically, the
Confrontation Clause was intended to target ex parte questioning
under English bail and committal statutes under Queen Mary, and
he stressed the requirement of solemnity such as in affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.170
Justice Thomas also criticized Davis for being unpredictable.171
He specifically criticized the dichotomy created between responding
to emergency situations and gathering evidence since the police
often have multiple motives for questioning an individual.172 Thus, it
may be difficult to determine the primary purpose of an
interrogation.173 For example, it is possible that the primary purpose
of the police officer in Hammon was to determine whether Amy was
in danger of further abuse.174
Justice Thomas’ analysis is apt in that the dichotomy between
cries for help and bearing witness in contemplation of legal
proceedings is somewhat arbitrary and false. Where does one end
and the other begin? In the real world, these two events often
happen simultaneously. As Deborah Tuerkheimer explains:

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 830.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 836–37.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 839.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 841.

125

BAILEY.PP3

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/30/2009 3:09 PM

[2009

A domestic violence victim’s safety may be wholly contingent on
her communication with police her “narration of events” linked
inexorably to resolving—however temporarily—the danger posed
by her batterer . . . . The “cry for help” may sound, then, much like
a narration of events because it is; a victim is describing battering
that will, in all likelihood, continue in the absence of some action
by law enforcement . . . . The exigency the victim experiences
requires a narration of past events in order to resolve the immediate
danger they precipitated. In short, the meaning of ‘exigency’ to a
victim of domestic violence is different than it is to victims of other
types of crime. This reality fatally undermines judicial reasoning
predicated on the “crying for help” versus “providing information
to law enforcement” rubric.175

In the case of McCottry, she called the police in order to seek
immediate protection from Davis.176 At the same time, however,
after Davis left, she informed the 911 operator that he was in
violation of his protective order.177 Thus, in addition to seeking
immediate protection from the police, one could assume that
McCottry also was seeking legal proceedings with respect to Davis’
violation of the protective order. If Davis was arrested and
prosecuted for this violation, she presumably would have temporary
safety from future abuse.
Similarly, as Justice Thomas noted, it is highly likely that the
police officer in Hammon was just as concerned about Amy’s
immediate safety as he was about gathering evidence for trial.178 In
addition, it is possible that Amy still felt in danger of her husband
even after the police arrived, and, therefore, the emergency remained
ongoing.179
The most glaring omission in Davis’ analysis, however, is a
discussion about the government producing evidence in domestic
violence trials. In Crawford, Justice Scalia seemed to be particularly
concerned about this potential for prosecutorial abuse.180 Because of
175. Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 5, at 23–25; see also Tuerkheimer,
Exigency, supra note 8 (critiquing the Court’s analysis of exigency in the domestic violence
context).
176. Davis, 547 U.S. at 831.
177. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 846 (Wash. 2005), aff’d, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
178. Id. at 839 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
179. Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 5.
180. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004); see also Kenneth Graham, The
Revolution Revised: A Guided Tour of Davis v. Washington, 2006 UCLA PUB. L. SERIES, Paper
6-07, at 21–22; Michael H. Graham, Special Report: Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124
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the widespread institution of mandatory arrest and mandatory
prosecution policies, it is safe to assume that once police respond to a
potential domestic violence incident, they immediately begin
collecting evidence for trial, even from the initial inquiry at the
scene. The police in most jurisdictions begin this investigation
assuming that the victim will not testify at trial.181 Thus, the police
take greater care to both document the demeanor of the victim at
the scene and record court-admissible statements.182
Post-Crawford, the American Prosecutor’s Research Institute
created a list of predicate questions for the express purpose of
enlisting the police in gathering statements that would survive
Crawford.183 These questions purported to help the police avoid the
appearance that the statements were the product of an
interrogation.184 Thus, as Myrna Raeder states: “It is fairly
disingenuous to claim that the officer doesn’t know a prosecution is
likely to occur when the jurisdiction has a pro or mandatory arrest
policy in domestic violence cases.”185
There is no reason to believe that this sophisticated preparation
of domestic violence cases will not continue post-Davis. It is true
that this practice is well intended to increase the number of
convicted perpetrators. Nevertheless, this practice involves the type
of “evil” that Scalia was most concerned about regarding
confrontation rights: the government’s involvement in producing
evidence for trial. For lower courts to stay true to the spirit of
Crawford, and presumably Davis, many out-of-court statements
S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 4, n.10–11 (2006); Michael L.
Seigel & Daniel Weisman, The Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements in a Post-Crawford
World, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 877, 890 (2007).
181. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 61, at 1187.
182. Id. (citing various jurisdictions where police are trained to gather evidence so that a
case can be tried without the victim). In fact, the police officers in Hammon followed standard
protocols that prosecutors recommend for preparing domestic violence cases. See Tracy Bahm,
DV 101, http://www.ndaa.org/apri/programs/vawa/dv_101.html#preparecase (suggesting
that law enforcement officers and prosecutors prepare a case as though the victim will not
testify). They separated the parties involved and conducted the interviews separately. See Bahm,
supra; see also Luisa Bigornia, Domestic Violence: Alternatives to Traditional Criminal
Prosecution of Spousal Abuse, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 57, 58–59 (2000) (noting that
prosecutors in San Diego routinely prosecute cases from evidence obtained from the police and
that they have a special form for recording the victim’s demeanor and statements).
183. See Sample Crawford Predicate Questions, 1 THE VOICE 8 (2004), available at
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/the_voice_vol_1_issue_1.pdf.
184. See id.
185. Raeder, supra note 65, at 340.
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made to police officers at the scene of domestic violence incidents
should not be admissible at trial unless the victim has been subject to
cross-examination. Furthermore, it is possible that many 911
statements also should not be admissible if 911 operators have been
trained to gather evidence for trial.
III. RECONSIDERING THE USE OF VICTIMLESS PROSECUTIONS
An honest reading of Crawford suggests that many out-of-court
statements should no longer be admissible in domestic violence trials
because of the sophisticated manner in which this evidence is
produced. Yet, a limitation on victimless prosecutions is not
necessarily a setback in the development of effective domestic
violence laws and policy. Indeed, a nondiscriminatory use of
victimless prosecutions may not be in the best interest of all domestic
violence victims. While the purpose of these types of prosecutions is
clearly to protect women, a nondiscriminatory use of these
prosecutions may also disempower women in ways that undermine
the original reasons that participants of the women’s movement
desired the involvement of the criminal justice system in domestic
violence in the first place. In other words, the goal of successful
prosecutions may have eclipsed the original goals of the women’s
movement.
As previously discussed, there has been a great deal of scholarship
on the effectiveness of mandatory arrest and mandatory prosecution
policies.186 There has been little discussion, however, about the
186. See supra Part I. For further discussion of these policies, see generally Deborah
Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors,
Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3 (1999) [hereinafter Epstein, Effective
Intervention] (suggesting that prosecutors, judges, and courts consider their role in improving
the criminal justice response to domestic violence), Deborah Epstein et al., Prioritizing
Victims’ Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 465 (2003) (advocating “prosecution in context” to maximize the
government’s responsiveness to an individual’s context in order to improve her long-time
safety without jeopardizing existing efforts under mandatory policies to keep batterers
accountable), Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic
Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843 (2002) (arguing that current domestic violence
policies, including mandatory policies, should be reassessed to consider procedural justice with
respect to defendants), G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic
Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237
(2005) (discussing how proponents of mandatory policies have conservatized the battered
women’s movement and dislocated them from their feminist origin), Sack, supra note 39, at
1657 (arguing that we should acknowledge and correct the shortcomings in the criminal
justice system’s response to domestic violence without abandoning its achievements), and
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effectiveness of victimless prosecutions in the domestic violence
context. It is my hope that this Article will encourage this dialogue.
Specifically, scholars need to reevaluate whether a nondiscriminatory
use of victimless prosecutions furthers or hinders the goals of
keeping women physically, emotionally, and mentally safe and of
deconstructing certain legal and political structures that encourage
the subordination of women.
To be clear, there are occasions when prosecuting a case without
the victim is not only helpful, but necessary. The most obvious
example of this type of circumstance is the prosecution of homicide
cases. In all homicide cases, the victim is not available to participate
in the murderer’s prosecution. Yet, prosecutors must proceed with
their prosecutions using evidence other than the victim’s live
testimony. In addition, some commentators argue that victimless
prosecutions may be necessary in cases where children are victims of
sexual assault, because the prosecution process may be too traumatic
for those children.187
A discussion on the merits of victimless prosecutions in every
type of criminal case is beyond the scope of this Article. I want to
acknowledge, however, that there are occasions when these types of
prosecutions are necessary and useful and that there may even be
some occasions when they are necessary and useful in certain
domestic violence cases.188 For example, as I will discuss further in
Section A, if a woman chooses not to testify because she has been
threatened with retaliatory violence, the forfeiture doctrine probably
allows her out-of-court statements to be admissible at trial.189
Victimless prosecutions in this context make sense.
Nevertheless, there are reasons other than just fear of retaliation
that domestic violence victims choose not to testify, including a lack
of material resources, lack of adequate protection from the legal
system when they do testify, and lack of quality interactions with

Donna Wills, Mandatory Prosecution in Domestic Violence Cases: Domestic Violence: The Case for
Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 173 (1997) (arguing that “no drop” policies
are an enlightened approach to domestic violence prosecutions).
187. See Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation Clause,
81 NEB. L. REV. 1258, 1280–85 (2003); Richard D. Friedman, Grappling With the Meaning of
“Testimonial,” 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 272 (2005).
188. Indeed the forfeiture doctrine may apply to certain domestic violence cases. For
further discussion of the forfeiture doctrine, see infra Part III.A.
189. See infra Part III.A.
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actors in the criminal justice system.190 For this reason, I caution
against the nondiscriminatory use of this practice in the domestic
violence context. There is no empirical evidence that women who do
not testify are physically safer191 than women who do. Given this fact,
a nondiscriminatory use of victimless prosecutions is particularly
problematic if it is indeed true that victimless prosecutions encourage
the systematic silence and disempowerment of women.
A. Are Women Really Safer When They Do Not Testify?
The potential silencing of women encouraged by victimless
prosecutions is particularly disturbing because it is not clear that
women are always safer when they do not testify. I do not question
whether one of the original intentions of victimless prosecutions was
to keep women safe. As has already been discussed, there are those
who believe that prosecuting batterers makes women safer.192
Moreover, some commentators and scholars believe that victimless
prosecutions allow these prosecutions to continue, while protecting
women from violence in retaliation for their testimony.193
Women who choose not to testify because they have been
threatened with retaliation from their batterers, however, already
have protection under the forfeiture doctrine. Justice Scalia made it
clear in both Crawford and Davis that this exception to the
Confrontation Clause still exists.194 The forfeiture doctrine is an
equitable doctrine under which a defendant is deemed to waive his
or her confrontation rights if the declarant is unavailable because of
the defendant’s wrongdoing.195 Consequently, some commentators
190. See infra Part IV.A.
191. One might argue that the victim’s emotional safety is also an important
consideration in domestic violence cases. As is the case for most victims who must confront the
perpetrators of their crimes at trial, there will be a certain level of anxiety created by having to
confront one’s batterer. Improving the victim’s interactions with actors in the criminal justice
system, however, could potentially decrease this anxiety to a manageable level. For further
discussion, see infra Part IV.A.3.
192. See supra Part I.
193. Lininger, supra note 12, at 771.
194. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
195. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–61 (1878) (allowing the out-ofcourt testimony of the defendant’s alleged second wife in a bigamy trial where there was
evidence that the defendant had attempted to hide her during the trial). For cases that discuss
the forfeiture doctrine in the domestic violence context, see State v. Wright, 726 N.W.2d 464,
479–82 (Minn. 2007) (remanding the case for a determination of whether the forfeiture
doctrine applied where there were allegations that the victim did not testify because she was
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argue that the forfeiture doctrine almost always applies in domestic
violence cases because the abuse itself prevents women from
testifying.196
Scholars should carefully analyze domestic violence cases,
however, before they determine that it is always the case that victims
do not testify because of the batterers’ wrongdoing.197 As loathsome
as domestic abuse is, there is still a constitutional obligation to
protect the confrontation rights of all defendants.
Moreover, it is not clear that women are always safer in the longterm when they do not testify or participate in prosecutions. In order
for victimless prosecutions to be successful in promoting the longterm safety of women, one must make one of two assumptions. One
assumption is that arrest and prosecution deter batterers from future
violence, and therefore, when the batterer returns to the victim’s
home, he will no longer abuse her. The other assumption is that the
arrest and conviction of her batterer allows a victim time to extricate
herself from a violent relationship and to become permanently safe.
With respect to the first assumption, as was discussed earlier, the
evidence is inconclusive on whether arrest deters future violence
from batterers.198 While some statistics suggest that no-drop
prosecution policies decrease the level of violence against women,199
concerned for her safety and because the defendant threatened her from jail), State v. Tyler,
155 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to apply the forfeiture doctrine in a
domestic violence case because the state failed to preserve the error for appeal), and State v.
Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 325–26 (W. Va. 2006) (remanding for a determination of whether
the forfeiture doctrine applied in a domestic violence case).
196. See Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 5, at 9 (stating that “in most
abusive relationships, ‘tampering’ conduct is inexorably bound up in the violent exercise of
power that is itself criminal”). But see Joan Comparet-Cassani, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1185,
1211 (2005) (arguing that the wrongful act must have been committed with the intention of
making the witness unavailable to testify at the defendant’s trial).
197. Of course, but for the batterer’s actions, there would be no prosecution and no
need for the victim to testify in the first place. But beyond this causal connection, there may be
other more direct reasons why a victim does not testify. For example, evidence suggests that
some victims do not testify because of poor interactions with actors in the criminal justice
system. For more discussion regarding reasons why domestic violence victims do not testify,
see infra Part IV.
198. See supra Part I. But see Tuerkheimer, Exigency, supra note 8, at 801 (arguing that
the investigation of a domestic violence crime and the ensuing arrest are the only way to
prevent injury to the victim in the midst of a violent act).
199. The level of nonfatal violent crimes against women dropped from 1.1 million in
1993 to 588,490 in 2001. Rennison, supra note 11. Proponents of no-drop policies in San
Diego credit the policy for decreasing the number of homicides from thirty in 1985 to seven in
1994. Gina L. Durham, The Domestic Violence Dilemma: How Our Ineffective and Varied
Responses Reflect Our Conflicted Views of the Problem, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 641, 651 (1998).
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other evidence suggests that, while no-drop policies may lower
dismissal rates and increase the number of domestic violence cases
that are prosecuted, prosecution does not necessarily reduce
recidivism.200 Moreover, because domestic violence incidents are
underreported, it is unclear how much violence women actually
experience under mandatory polices.201
With respect to the latter assumption, most women must make
several attempts to leave a relationship before they succeed.202 Thus,
even if a woman wants to leave a violent relationship, it is often very
difficult. First, batterers are most often punished with nothing more
than probation or short jail time.203 For this reason, women have
very little time to escape before their batterers are back on the street
or back in their homes.
Furthermore, separation may increase the instigation of
violence.204 According to Martha Mahoney, “[a]t least half of women
who leave their abusers are followed and harassed or further
attacked. In one study of interspousal homicide, more than half of
the men who killed their spouses did so when the partners were
separated.”205
In addition, many domestic violence victims do not have the
economic resources to live on their own, and therefore, must rely on
their batterers for their basic needs.206 Many women cannot afford to
leave their batterers.
Finally, there is no empirical evidence that shows that
prosecuting these cases without the victims’ involvement or
testimony makes women safer from further abuse. Further research
200. See Coker, supra note 39, at 817–18 (“[O]f those studies [analyzing prosecution’s
effects on recidivism] that exist, several find that no particular outcome of prosecution is
significantly related to recidivism.”); Mills, supra note 18, at 567–68 (“A recent study on the
effects of prosecution on recidivism presented striking results[—]that prosecution had no effect
on the likelihood of re-arrest of the batterer within a six-month period.”); Sack, supra note 39,
at 1681.
201. Mahoney, supra note 14, at 11.
202. Id. at 63.
203. Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic
Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1508, 1521–22 (1998) (“Of those cases that are
prosecuted, many are charged or pled down to misdemeanors despite facts that suggest the
conduct constituted a felony.”). “[G]ender bias task force reports indicate that judges impose
lighter sentences on defendants convicted of domestic violence crimes than [on] those [who
commit violence] against strangers.” Epstein, Effective Intervention, supra note 186, at 43.
204. Mahoney, supra note 14, at 65.
205. Id. at 64–65.
206. See infra Part IV.A.
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needs to be conducted on this issue, and specifically, scholars should
research whether the victims’ participation in the prosecution process
may actually improve their level of safety in the long term.
B. Are Victimless Prosecutions Encouraging the Systematic Silence of
Women?
Under current practice, many domestic violence victims need not
speak at all within the criminal justice system, other than through the
statements they make in a 911 call or in a police statement. Without
further communication with these women, however, the context of
their experiences remains unknown. For example, how often has the
woman been battered by this perpetrator? Does she have the
resources to remove herself from the violence? Is the woman
separated from the perpetrator, or has she attempted to leave the
perpetrator in the past? Is the woman an immigrant or a woman of
color? All of these questions are potentially relevant in determining
the amount of danger the woman faces, the likelihood she has of
gaining safety in the future, and the reasons she has become a victim
of domestic abuse in the first place.207
Because these statements lack context, therefore, one might
argue that victimless prosecutions encourage the legal silence of
women. First, they are most obviously silent by not testifying and
speaking out against their batterers. But even more importantly, it
increases their silence within the discourse on the domestic violence
laws and policies that are supposed to help them.208
My concern about silencing is obviously not relevant in the
victimless prosecutions of homicide cases. In addition, there may be
other contexts where the benefits of victimless prosecutions
outweigh any harm that is caused by the silence of the victim. For
example, assuming that there are no Confrontation Clause
violations, any potential harm caused by the silence of child victims
207. See supra Part I.D and infra Part IV.A.
208. Of course, the legal process is not the only forum where domestic violence victims’
voices may be heard. Victims also can engage in policy discourse through the political process.
For example, they can host rallies, write their legislators, and lobby Congress. The political and
legal processes are not mutually exclusive, however, and both are important in creating change.
In addition, one wonders how willing victims will be to engage in the political process if their
initial interactions with legal actors during the investigative and prosecution process are
negative. See infra note 209. Finally, it seems unlikely that women will be willing to participate
in the political process if they are not first willing to speak out against their batterer in a public
setting like a trial.
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of sexual assaults may be outweighed by the potential emotional
harms that these children might suffer if they testify.
The systematic silence of domestic violence victims, however, is
troubling because most of these victims are women, and women
historically have been politically and legally subordinate and silent in
our society. As discussed in greater detail in this Section, the legal
silencing of subordinated groups is especially significant because it
reinforces the disempowerment and marginalization that these
groups already experience.
Some commentators might argue that, as is the case with child
victims of sexual assault, the traumatic experience and possible
dangerous repercussions of testifying outweigh any potential harm
caused by silence. While this might be the case for some victims of
domestic violence, particularly for women who are in extreme danger
of physical retaliation, there are still women who do not necessarily
require this type of protection.209 As adults, women do not require
the same type of protection as children. Indeed, equating women to
children undermines their goal of social, political, and legal equality
with men. For this reason, we need to closely examine when
victimless prosecutions are necessary and when victim participation
can plausibly be encouraged.
Focusing on the silencing of defendants in the criminal legal
system, Alexandra Natapoff notes that there is a phenomenon of
legal silencing of subordinated groups.210 This phenomenon is
problematic because being heard within the legal process can be an
important part of the larger power struggle of social meaning.211
“Discourse—the way things are talked about—is an exercise in

209. According to experts, many domestic violence victims do not testify because of a
lack of material resources and a lack of quality interactions with actors in the criminal justice
system, not simply fear of retaliation from the batterer. See infra Part IV. In addition, it may be
that certain changes within the criminal justice system could provide better protection for
victims. See infra Part IV.A.3.
210. Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1449, 1452–53 (2005); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991) (discussing how poverty law
clients are often silenced within the attorney-client relationship); Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the
Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 533 (1992) (discussing how the poor are silenced in Baltimore’s rent courts); Mari J.
Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last
Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991) (arguing that accent discrimination is a form of
racial subordination).
211. Natapoff, supra note 210, at 1453.
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power.”212 As Catharine MacKinnon has stated, “the less speech you
have, the more the speech of those who have it keeps you
unequal.”213
Speaking, therefore, has value as a form of self-expression,
recognition, and participation.214 When individuals do not have
speech, they are ignored, which leads to their disempowerment.
Furthermore, when certain viewpoints are not heard, we cannot be
sure that the legal system is truly effective. For these reasons,
encouraging the silence of domestic violence victims encourages
their complicity in their subordination not only by their batterers,
but also by the legal system. With respect to victimless prosecutions,
three important issues need to be explored: whether domestic
violence victims are ignored by the criminal legal system, whether
more speech could lead to more effective domestic violence laws and
policy, and whether silent domestic violence victims are complicit
with their subordination.
1. Are domestic violence victims ignored?
In her discussion on defendant silencing, Natapoff refers to
classic themes of free speech.215 One of these classic themes is that
free speech is a prerequisite for participatory democracy and selfgovernance.216 In order to be responsive to the will of the people,
the government must allow for “free political discussion.”217 Free
speech allows individuals “to participate in and shape the public
debate.”218
Another scholar, Kimberle Crenshaw, specifically discusses how
women of color are left out of the public debate within the domestic
violence context.219 According to Crenshaw, the needs of women of
color are ignored because their experiences are silenced within the
discourse of domestic violence law and policy.220 She notes that
antiracist politics suppress discussion of domestic violence within
212. Id. at 1490–91.
213. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 72 (1993).
214. Natapoff, supra note 210, at 1475.
215. Id. at 1487–91.
216. Id. at 1488.
217. Id. at 1488–89 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
218. Id. at 1489.
219. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
220. Id.
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nonwhite communities.221 For example, some African-Americans
suppress discussion of domestic violence within their own
community out of fears of perpetuating the stereotype that AfricanAmerican men are violent.222 Likewise, in an attempt to stress the
fact that domestic violence occurs in white middle-class and upperclass communities, commentators focus on these women’s
experiences and silence the needs and experiences of women of
color.223 As a result, women of color are marginalized and
disempowered.224 In other words, when individuals are silenced, they
are ignored.
While Crenshaw focuses on the silencing of women of color in
the domestic violence context, it is possible that the practice of
victimless prosecutions encourages the silence of all women who do
not testify. It is easy to see how domestic violence victims may be
ignored (whether intentionally or not) within victimless
prosecutions. Once the prosecutor has the victim’s statement, she is
no longer needed to complete the prosecution, and the process can
continue without her. Indeed, some prosecutors might prefer it that
way because it can be difficult for prosecutors to get domestic
violence victims to cooperate fully and easily in the prosecution of
their batterers.225 In addition, some prosecutors may believe that the
prosecution will be more successful without the victim because juries
may find a victim less credible if she does not fit their mental
stereotypes of a domestic violence victim.226 Thus, a
nondiscriminatory use of victimless prosecutions in the domestic
violence context is quite tempting to the prosecutor because it
arguably makes prosecutions of batterers more attainable.
The problem with the wholesale use of victimless prosecutions,
however, is that the victim is literally removed from the criminal
justice process, and her needs and experiences become irrelevant to
221. Id. at 1256.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1258–62.
224. Id. at 1241–45.
225. See infra Part IV.A.3.
226. See Busching, supra note 45, at 396 n.17; Laurie S. Kohn, Barriers to Reliable
Credibility Assessments: Domestic Violence Victim-Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 733, 743–44 (2003) (noting how domestic violence victims are multi-faceted individuals
who may not fit the stereotype of being helpless, passive, and fearful). Ironically, limiting the
“type” of domestic violence victim that makes it to the stand perpetuates jurors’ stereotypical
images of domestic violence victims.
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the goal of prosecuting the batterer. Whether prosecution is in the
victim’s best interest and what effect the prosecution might have on
the victim are no longer the concern of the legal system.
It is true that prosecutors have always had the discretion to
prosecute a case regardless of the wishes of the victim. Indeed,
prosecutors represent the state’s interests, not necessarily just those
of the victim.227 The consideration of the victims’ wishes in domestic
violence cases seems most urgent, however. A victim of domestic
violence is in more danger than the typical assault victim because she
is in an ongoing relationship with her assailant. Therefore, she is at
greater risk of future violence by this assailant.228 For this reason, it
makes sense to consider the opinions of domestic violence victims in
determining the best ways to keep them safe, even if this opinion is
not always determinative.
In addition, from a self-governance perspective, a legitimate legal
system should want to hear from these women.229 Not only should
these women have a voice in how domestic violence laws and policies
benefit and protect them, but they should also have a voice in
determining when prosecution is in their best interest. Otherwise,
these women are disempowered from participating in a legal system
that is supposed to help them, and they are subordinated by a legal
system that ignores them.
2. Does speech lead to effective policy?
Another classic theme of free speech is that free speech leads to
truth in the “marketplace of ideas.”230 In other words, free speech
“plays an important role in permitting social truths to emerge . . .
silencing voices within that ‘marketplace’ impedes rigorous inquiry
into truth. By extension, when viewpoints are excluded from the
public debate, it undermines confidence in the conclusions.”231

227. See the discussion of Cheryl Hanna’s views on mandatory policies supra Part I.C.3
for a description of the state’s interests in domestic violence cases.
228. See supra Part II.A.
229. Cf. Natapoff, supra note 210, at 1480–90 (arguing that a legitimate criminal system
would include an opportunity for expressive participation from defendants).
230. In discussing the First Amendment, Justice Holmes said that “the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
231. Natapoff, supra note 210, at 1487.
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The silence of domestic violence victims’ voices within the
criminal justice system, encouraged by victimless prosecutions, is
problematic because we need these women’s experiences to test and
improve upon the effectiveness of our laws and policies. Elizabeth
Schneider argues that feminist theory rests on the “notion that
women’s experience is the central starting point of theory.”232
“[T]heory flows from experience in the world, and then theory
refines and modifies that experience.”233 Schneider emphasizes “the
need for close attention to the interrelationship between theory and
practice in our experience of the complexity of women’s lives and in
the articulation of women’s experiences into legal claims.”234 She also
stresses that feminist theoretical work must be both particular in
documenting women’s experiences and general in “linking violence
against women to women’s subordination in society and to more
general social problems of abuse of power and control.”235 She warns
that the theoretical framework must be expanded to avoid essentialist
thinking because in reality “battered women are not similarly
situated.”236
In this same vein, Martha Mahoney discusses the
interrelationship between women’s lives, culture, and law:
This relationship is not linear (moving from women’s lives to law,
or from law to life) but interactive: cultural assumptions about
domestic violence affect substantive law and methods of litigation
in ways that in turn affect society’s perceptions of women; both law
and societal perceptions affect women’s understanding of our own
lives, relationships, and options; our lives are part of the culture
that affects legal interpretation and within which further legal
moves are made. Serious harm to women results from the ways in
which law and culture distort our experience.237

In other words, to be effective, domestic laws and policies need
to be in constant interaction and dialogue with the real life
experiences of women. This dialogue will provide more information
about what women need from these laws and policies in order to
keep them safe. We also are better able to see which current policies
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
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are working and which policies are actually perpetuating gender
subordination and violence. Moreover, we may find that some
policies might be good for some women, but not good for others.
By changing these laws and policies to better reflect the experiences
of all women, we can change how domestic violence victims and
women are generally perceived. We can stop seeing domestic
violence victims as a faceless stereotype and begin understanding the
complexities of domestic violence that affect women from all races,
cultures, and income levels. Victimless prosecutions limit the
likelihood that this dialogue takes place because they remove victims
from the process and they encourage silence.238 This silence limits
the effectiveness of domestic violence policy because it responds to a
potentially limited view of the real experiences of women.
3. Are silent domestic violence victims complicit with their
subordination?
Dorothy Roberts argues that silence can make one complicit with
one’s subordination.239 As an example, she discusses how the legal
system silences African-American welfare mothers as a “part of a
ritual of humiliation by the bureaucrats who supervise them.”240 If a
woman tries to defend her spending habits during a hearing, she
risks being cut off from benefits.241 This system punishes these
women when they speak; thus, they must assume a submissive stance
in order not to offend those who have power over them.242 This
silence is undoubtedly an act of survival. Yet because it also
perpetuates the welfare mothers’ submissiveness to government
bureaucrats, this silence makes these women complicit with their
subordination.
Similarly, women of color who refuse medical treatment are
often ignored by judges and doctors because they do not use the
238. Cf. Bezdek, supra note 210, at 533–42 (arguing that Baltimore rent courts fail the
poor because they are institutionally silenced); Natapoff, supra note 210, at 1488 (arguing that
criminal defendants’ voices are significant in determining the efficiencies and inefficiencies of
the criminal process as well as its claims of fairness).
239. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Paradox of Silence: Some Questions About Silence as
Resistance, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 343, 355–56 (2000) (responding to Professor Margaret
Montoya’s Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal & Centrifugal Forces in Legal
Communication, Pedagogy, and Resources, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 263 (2000)).
240. Roberts, supra note 239, at 347–49.
241. Id. at 348.
242. See id.
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dominant medical language.243 Roberts cites Rayna Rapp’s study that
described African-American women who declined amniocentesis.
They often explained their decisions in “terms of nonmedical systems
of interpreting their pregnancies, including religion, visions, and folk
healing.”244 Another study cited by Roberts examined cases where
court orders for involuntary cesareans were sought.245 Eighty-one
percent of the cases studied involved women of color.246 Like the
women in Rapp’s study, some of these women explained their
reasons for not wanting the surgery in nonmedical terms.247 Yet
“[j]udges and doctors often dismiss these explanations not expressed
in the dominant medical language as illegitimate.”248 Although these
women actually did use their voices, the doctors effectively silenced
them by subordinating the patients’ wishes to those of the
doctors.249 Roberts explains, “They describe pregnant women of
color who refuse medical treatment as angry, irrational, fearful,
stubborn, selfish, and uncooperative. The medical model of
childbirth interprets these women’s words in a way that justifies the
doctors’ control.”250
Finally, Roberts argues that the silence of students of color in the
classroom may be a form of accommodation of the dominant
discourse.251 She concludes,
[S]ilence is often the very objective of subordinating forces.
Remaining silent in the face of injustice may even turn people into
accomplices in injustice. Black women’s experience in welfare and
doctors’ offices shows that silencing is a powerful tool to reinforce
subordination, while language can be a powerful tool to resist the
dominant mindset.252

While the originators of mandatory policies and victimless
prosecutions did not intend to oppress women, such policies and
procedures may be subordinating women by encouraging silence. As
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
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has already been discussed, participants in the women’s movement
originally intended mandatory policies to respond to women, and
specifically to the issue of domestic violence, which the law had
historically ignored. Yet the frustrations that some legal actors
express about domestic violence victims being “noncooperative” or
“irrational” when it comes to the prosecution of their batterers
sound eerily similar to the criticisms that Roberts cites from
physicians about the medical wishes of some women of color. This
striking similarity raises the concern that the silence of women via
victimless prosecutions will subordinate their needs and experiences
to the will of the legal system. As a result, the goal of increasing the
number of arrests and prosecutions of batterers may overpower the
goals of safety, gender equality, and autonomy.
Since victimless prosecutions encourage the silence of domestic
violence victims, we should ask whether this practice encourages
women to be complicit with their subordination by both their
batterers and the legal system. By not testifying and speaking out
against violence, victims arguably are complicit with their batterers’
abuse. In addition, by not engaging in an active dialogue with the
legal system about what they need from domestic violence laws and
policies, victims arguably are complicit with a legal and political
system that historically has ignored women in pursuit of its own
agenda.
With respect to domestic violence victims of color, Kimberle
Crenshaw has stated:
Within communities of color, efforts to stem the politicization of
domestic violence are often grounded in attempts to maintain the
integrity of the community. The articulation of this perspective
takes different forms. Some critics allege that feminism has no place
within communities of color, that the issues are internally divisive,
and that they represent the migration of white women’s concerns
into a context in which they are not only irrelevant but also
harmful. At its most extreme, this rhetoric denies that gender
violence is a problem in the community and characterizes any effort
to politicize gender subordination as itself a community
problem.253

In other words, out of respect for their racial communities,
women of color are expected to keep silent in the face of domestic
253. Crenshaw, supra note 219, at 1253.
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violence. They “must weigh their interests in avoiding issues that
might reinforce distorted public perceptions against the need to
acknowledge and address intracommunity problems.”254 Many
African-American women may feel pressure to conceal the violence
they experience because they want to limit racial stereotyping against
African-American men.255 Similarly, some Asian women hide the
violence they experience at home because “saving the honor of the
family from shame is a priority.”256 Crenshaw points out, however,
that “this priority tends to be interpreted as obliging women not to
scream rather than obliging men not to hit.”257
Women of color also may be hesitant to call the police because
they do not want to “subject their private lives to the scrutiny and
control of a police force that is frequently hostile” to people of
color.258 Crenshaw argues that for members of racially subordinated
groups, the home may “function as a safe haven from the indignities
of life in a racist society . . . but for this ‘safe haven,’ in many cases,
women of color victimized by violence might otherwise seek
help.”259
Instead, while women of color stay silent in order to maintain
the integrity of their respective racial groups, the violence continues.
By not speaking out against this violence and by not effectively using
legal remedies to end this violence, these women are being complicit
in the violence against them. Crenshaw aptly argues that the
silencing of domestic violence in communities of color must end if
we are going to adequately address this issue.260 This Article
contends that complicity from silence occurs among all races of
women who are victims of domestic violence.
In order to end the complicity of women in domestic violence,
criminal laws and policies need to discourage their silence. By
participating in the prosecution of her batterer, the victim literally
and symbolically stands up against her batterer, which may enable
her to gain the confidence she needs to build a life without abuse. As
Alafair S. Burke has argued, “participating in the prosecution of a
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
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batterer can be a kind of ‘coming out,’ providing confirmation of
[the victim’s] experiences.”261 In addition, participating in the
prosecution informs the batterer that he can no longer control the
victim. Abusers control their victims mentally, not just physically.262
As long as the abuser mentally controls the victim, the abuse will
continue.263 Speaking out against the abuse and participating in the
prosecution of one’s batterer may be an important step in gaining
control of one’s life.
Finally, limiting the use of victimless prosecutions forces more
interaction between the victim and the criminal justice system; this
interaction limits the system’s ability to subordinate the victim’s
needs to its own agenda.
IV. A MORE INCLUSIVE APPROACH
As stated previously, this Article does not contend that
prosecution is the right course of action for all domestic violence
victims. It also does not contend that we should automatically accept
a substantial reduction in domestic violence prosecutions because of
Crawford and Davis.264 Instead, if participation in the prosecution
process can be empowering for victims, perhaps we should look for
ways to encourage more participation when possible.
A. Why Don’t Women Testify?
Evidence suggests that many domestic violence victims are silent
because the legal system is inadequate in dealing with their cases.
While fear of retaliation may be one of the reasons that victims do
261. Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An Alternative
Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552, 576 (2007). Burke argues that the criminal
law itself limits the willingness of victims to testify because it focuses on individual instances of
physical violence within an abusive relationship and because it ignores prior violence in
evaluating whether a crime has been committed, and thus victims are hindered in their ability
to tell the complete story of their abuse. Id. at 575. For further discussion of this argument,
see infra Part IV.A.3.
262. Mills, supra note 18, at 586–94; see also http://www.domesticviolence.org/
violence-wheel (last visited Jan.20, 2009) (explaining how physical abuse is just one aspect of
domestic violence and how batterers mainly control their victims through mental, emotional,
and financial abuse).
263. Mills, supra note 18, at 586–94.
264. Tom Lininger has cited a survey that found a substantial drop in domestic violence
cases since Crawford. See Lininger, supra note 12, at 750 (citing a survey done by the
University of Oregon between 2004 and 2005 evaluating sixty-four counties in California,
Oregon, and Washington).
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not testify against their batterers,265 other key reasons that they do
not testify are a lack of material resources, a lack of protection from
the criminal justice system when they do testify, and a lack of quality
interactions with the criminal justice system.266 This section discusses
these reasons in detail and uses Chicago’s TAC program as a model
for encouraging victim participation. While some may doubt whether
victim participation in domestic violence prosecutions is realistic,
Chicago’s TAC program suggests that under the right circumstances,
victims will be willing to testify against their batterers.
1. Battered women lack material resources
Donna Coker argues that women are more vulnerable to
violence, more accessible to batterers, and do not separate from their
batterers because of inadequate material resources.267 This lack of
resources also explains why women do not want to testify in court or
often recant and testify on behalf of their batterers in court.
“Women’s decisions whether or not to support criminal intervention
are often related to whether or not they can afford to prioritize
prosecution over other more immediate concerns such as food,
employment, and childcare.”268 When a woman walks away from a
violent relationship, she faces a fifty percent chance that her standard
of living will drop below the poverty line.269 Moreover, nearly half of
all homeless women and children have fled violence in the home.270
265. As has already been discussed, out-of-court statements from women who are in real
danger of retaliation are probably still admissible under the forfeiture doctrine. See supra Part
II.A.
266. Of course, there may be other reasons that women might not want to testify against
their batterers, including an emotional attachment to the batterer and a desire to make the
marriage work. See Coker, supra note 63, at 1015. A lack of material resources, safety, and
positive interactions with the criminal justice system, however, seem to be the chief reasons. See
Elaine Chiu, Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1253
(2001) (arguing that the main reasons that women stay in violent relationships derive from the
political, social, and financial inequalities between the sexes rather than from a purely
emotional desire to work through an abusive relationship).
267. Donna Coker, Addressing Domestic Violence Through a Strategy of Economic Rights,
24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 187, 188 (2003); see also Sack, supra note 39, at 1734 (arguing that
the number one reason women stay with batterers is economic dependence and that “[t]he
most likely predictor of whether a battered woman will permanently separate from her abuser is
whether she has the economic resources to survive without him”).
268. Coker, supra note 39, at 823; see also Mahoney, supra note 14, at 62 (noting a lack
of resources for women who separate from their batterers).
269. Lininger, supra note 12, at 769.
270. Epstein, Effective Intervention, supra note 186, at 8.
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Remember that Amy Hammon asked the court not to incarcerate
her husband so that he could continue to provide for their family.
For many women, the reality is that incarceration of their spouses
means destitution and homelessness for their families.271
2. Battered women are not adequately protected
While the criminal justice system’s response to battered women
has vastly improved over the years, women still are not necessarily
safe after they seek its assistance. One of the most common
misconceptions about domestic violence, and one of the important
premises of victimless prosecutions, is that separation from an abuser
equates to safety.272 An attempt to separate from one’s batterer,
however, can be very dangerous.273 Linda Mills argues that women
are safest when they willingly partner with state actors to investigate
and prosecute domestic violence cases.274 Unfortunately, however,
the criminal justice system sometimes fails to protect these women
even when they are willing participants.
This failure is evident in the story of Evette Cade. After several
years of abuse from her husband, Cade finally separated from him.275
Although she filed a protection order, her estranged husband still
continued to harass and to intimidate Cade, her daughter, and her
family, and he vandalized her family members’ property.276 Then,
one day Cade’s husband filed a motion to have the protective order
removed, claiming that he wanted to save his marriage through
counseling.277
On the day of the hearing on Cade’s husband’s motion, Cade
showed up, but her husband did not.278 Nevertheless, the judge
decided to continue with the hearing.279 Cade attempted to explain
how her husband had been violating the protective order and how
271. Id.; see also Coker, supra note 267, at 188 (“Abusive men cause women to lose jobs,
educational opportunities, careers, homes, savings, their health, [and] their ability to enter the
workplace.”).
272. Coker, supra note 267, at 190.
273. Mahoney, supra note 14, at 80.
274. Mills, supra note 18, at 551.
275. The Oprah Winfrey Show: A Mother Burned Alive By Her Husband (ABC television
broadcast May 3, 2006).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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she felt in danger.280 She also tried to show the judge pictures that
evidenced his vandalism.281 The judge would not listen to her,
however, and when Cade expressed that she wanted to get an
immediate divorce, he replied, sarcastically, “Well, I’d like to be 6foot-5, but that’s not what we do here. You have to go to the
divorce court for that.”282 Cade continued to try to explain how her
husband was violating the protective order.283 The judge cut her off,
removed the protective order, and perfunctorily stated, “This case is
dismissed at the request of the petitioner.”284 Three weeks later,
Cade’s estranged husband arrived at Cade’s workplace, doused her
with gasoline, and set her on fire.285 Cade suffered severe burns all
over her body and endured eighteen operations.286 Cade will be
recovering from her physical and emotional injuries for life. When
later asked about his decision to remove the protective order, the
judge remarked that it was a “clerical error.”287
Stories like Cade’s underscore the importance of protecting
women who are trying to use the system to end the violence in their
lives. When a batterer violates his protective order, he needs to be
immediately punished. If a batterer is let out on bail, his victim needs
to be contacted immediately so that she can prepare and make a
safety plan.288 In the courthouse, measures need to be in place so
that women do not have to sit in unsecured rooms with their
batterers for hours.289 If the criminal justice system provides more
protection for these women, they will be more willing and better
able to participate in the prosecution process.

280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Ninety percent of jurisdictions surveyed by Tom Lininger reported that the majority
of defendants accused of domestic violence are released from jail pending trial. Lininger, supra
note 12, at 814.
289. Many jurisdictions have reported that victims are at risk of abuse in the courthouse
because there are no separate waiting areas for victims and defendants and there are no security
services. See Epstein, Effective Intervention, supra note 186, at 34.
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3. The criminal justice system’s negative response toward battered
women
In addition to a lack of material resources and physical safety, the
quality of victims’ interactions with actors in the criminal justice
system affects their willingness to participate in the prosecution of
their batterers.290 One survey found that women “were more afraid
of the courts and the law than they were of harming their
relationship with” their partner or retaliation from their partner.291
Women were most concerned that prosecutors would not prepare
them for trial and that the defendant would not be found guilty.292
Prosecutors need to make sure that they communicate with
victims and that they inform victims of what to expect during the
prosecution process. Prosecutors also need to reassure them about
the process. Deborah Epstein cites an example of a woman in
Washington D.C. who failed to appear as a witness in the criminal
prosecution of her batterer.293 When asked why, she explained that
during her civil protective order hearing, she had pled with the judge
to jail her perpetrator.294 He told her that he did not have the power
to do so.295 For that reason, she thought it was futile to attend the
criminal cases; no one had explained to her the difference between
the two proceedings.296 Eve and Carl Buzawa have also documented
how ill informed domestic violence victims are about the prosecution
process, which can lead to high rates of victim attrition.297
In addition to a lack of communication and information, some
actors in the criminal justice system sometimes exhibit a negative
response to battered women. As previously discussed in Part III,
women of color are often hesitant to contact the police because
290. Coker, supra note 39, at 840; see also Mills, supra note 18, at 595 (citing studies
that suggest that when a battered woman has a negative interaction with the state, she is less
likely to rely on government assistance in the future).
291. OFFICE JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S DEP’T JUST., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH:
SUMMARIES FOR JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS 13 (Barbara E. Smith ed., 2003) (summarizing
JOANNE BELKNAP ET AL., FACTORS RELATED TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT DISPOSITIONS
IN A LARGE URBAN AREA (2000)), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
202564.pdf).
292. Id. at 13.
293. Epstein, Effective Intervention, supra note 186, at 26–27.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE 189 (3d ed. 2003).
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historically their communities have had negative interactions with
law enforcement. More generally, prosecutors often do not
understand why victims refuse to leave abusive partners or to help
with the prosecution of their batterers.298 This misunderstanding can
make some prosecutors indifferent and cynical.299 Prosecutors also
may erect barriers that “test” the commitment of victims to
prosecute.300 This attitude can lead more victims to drop charges or
not to appear in court.301 The victims’ actions then continue to
reinforce the beliefs of prosecutors, police, and other staff that
becoming involved in domestic violence cases is futile.302 Thus, there
is a vicious cycle between the lack of cooperation of victims and the
negative attitudes among legal actors that result from this lack of
cooperation.
Another study found that court clerks, who were supposed to
help women file protective orders, provided little assistance to
women with special needs such as literacy barriers and language
translation.303 In addition, some clerks actively discouraged women
from filing protective orders.304
Finally, Deborah Tuerkheimer and Alafair S. Burke have argued
that the criminal law itself also may limit the willingness of victims to
participate in the prosecution of their batterers.305 The law focuses
on individual instances of physical violence within an abusive
relationship, and it ignores prior violence in evaluating whether a
crime has been committed.306 Yet, prior abuse is quite relevant in
understanding the batterer’s “continuing effort to control his
victim.”307 The law restricts the victim’s ability to explain this
dynamic as part of her personal narrative. Alafair explains,

298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An
Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 172
(1993).
304. Id.
305. Burke, supra note 261, at 575 (citing Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and
Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 959, 991–98 (2004)).
306. Id.
307. Id.
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Cognizant of the statutory elements of the offense that must be
proven, police and prosecutors hone in on only the severity of the
physical contact involved in the discrete incident. They do not ask
her about the ways in which he tried to limit her agency, restrict
her options, and make her feel small. If she offers these anecdotes
anyway, no one will make note of them because the current law
renders them unimportant. If she tells her story the way she
perceives it, and continues to talk about legally irrelevant aspects of
her relationship, she might be reprimanded as a bad witness.308

Tuerkheimer and Alafair argue that this incongruity between the
law and the actual experiences of domestic violence victims limits the
victims’ satisfaction with the criminal justice system and their
willingness to participate in the prosecution of their batterers.309
For all of these reasons, it is important that actors in the criminal
justice system become better educated about domestic violence and
about the reasons why victims may be hesitant to cooperate in the
prosecution of their batterers. An increased understanding about the
dynamics of domestic violence may lead legal actors to become more
sensitive to these women when they seek assistance. These actors
then will be better able to provide adequate information about the
criminal and civil process. Furthermore, communities specifically
need to address and remedy the causes of poor relations between
legal actors and people of color. Cooperation on the part of these
actors is essential if women are going to take an active role in
prosecutions. Finally, laws that reflect the ongoing nature of the
abusive relationship may allow victims to accurately tell their
narratives, which may increase their satisfaction with the criminal
justice system and their willingness to participate in the prosecution
of their batterers.
B. Chicago’s TAC Model
Cook County, Illinois, has successfully implemented a
prosecution-based collaborative approach in which service providers,
community advocacy groups, civil attorneys, and prosecutors work
together in one unit.310 The County’s program, known as TAC
308. Id. at 577.
309. Id. at 575–78. As a result, both Tuerkheimer and Alafair argue that criminal law
needs to move away from a “transaction-based” approach. Id. at 555–56.
310. Richard Devine, Targeting High Risk Domestic Violence Cases: The Cook County,
Chicago Experience, 34 PROSECUTOR, Mar.–Apr. 2000, at 30; see also Cook County State’s
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(“Target Abuser Call”), encourages victim participation by directly
addressing the reasons that women do not testify. TAC provides
victims with a variety of services to address their immediate problems
and helps them to prepare for the future.311
Cook County’s State Attorney Richard Devine has found that
when services are not immediately accessible to the victim, she often
does not follow through on seeking out these services and stays
trapped in a violent situation.312 For that reason, TAC provides onsite services to address economic and other concerns.313 When
adequately funded, as many as eighty percent of TAC victims have
appeared and participated in the prosecution process, and TAC has
had an eighty to ninety percent conviction rate.314
TAC focuses on high-risk misdemeanor cases.315 It looks for
repeat offenders at the misdemeanor level in order to stem violence
before it escalates.316 A focus group of lethality experts came up with
a list of high risk factors for escalating violence: strangulation,
resisting arrest, violation of orders of protection, status of the
relationship (for example, has the victim indicated to the offender
that the relationship is terminated?), public incidents of violence, and
stressors, such as the offender’s job status and his response to the
relationship’s termination.317 The most important factor is whether
the victim has indicated to the offender that she wants to end the
relationship.318
The TAC unit has prosecutors with felony experience.319
Seasoned prosecutors “send a message to the judiciary that
[domestic violence] cases should be taken seriously.”320 The unit also
Attorney’s Office, http://www.statesattorney.org/dvtac.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
While this Article focuses on TAC, it should be noted that there are other cities that have also
implemented programs that use a coordinated community response type of model. See, e.g.,
Family Justice Center, http://www.familyjusticecenter.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
311. Devine, supra note 310.
312. Id. at 31.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 31; see also Liam Ford, A Domestic Violence Program that Works, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 10, 2008, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-domestic-target-abusersideoct10,0,6455136.story.
315. Devine, supra note 310.
316. Id. at 31.
317. Id. at 31–32.
318. Id. at 32.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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has a victim specialist who makes sure that victims understand court
proceedings, completes order of protection paperwork for the victim,
and makes telephone calls reminding the victim of court dates and
assisting in securing evidence.321
A few days after the violent incident, an investigator from TAC
will begin building a relationship with the victim. The investigator
serves a subpoena during this visit, but she also takes the time to
explain the prosecution process to the victim, reassures her that she
will receive assistance throughout this process, gives the victim the
names of everyone on the TAC team, answers questions, and
conducts a follow-up investigation.322
To ensure that the victim is safe and that her non-court needs are
met, the independent advocate provides access to shelter and
counseling and helps the victim create a safety plan.323 Her files are
confidential and cannot be released to anyone without the victim’s
written consent.324 In addition, the independent advocate assists with
obtaining resources after the victim’s case is over.325
The civil law attorney helps the victim with family law, child
support, custody, and visitation issues and with orders of
protection.326 The victim’s civil cases continue regardless of the
disposition of her criminal case.327 TAC also monitors offenders for
sentence and probation violations.328 Once a violation is detected,
the defendant’s case is immediately set for hearing within a few days,
and the victim is notified immediately of the violation.329 In addition,
the investigator assists in securing the victim’s safety.330
Thus, TAC includes the victim in the prosecution process by
directly addressing the economic and safety needs that often make
her reluctant to seek the prosecution of her batterer. It also provides
a supportive, cooperative environment that takes away any sense of
alienation she might feel in the typical prosecution scenario.

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. Challenges to the Systematic Implementation of the TAC Model
While the TAC program is encouraging because it demonstrates
that there are contexts where domestic violence victims will testify
against their batterers, it will take some time before testifying
domestic violence victims will become the rule rather than the
exception. First, domestic violence victims and legal actors are going
to have to be convinced that victims can and will testify before it can
be expected that they will not view such programs as futile. Second,
most jurisdictions have limited resources that curb their ability to
create a program similar to TAC.331 For these reasons, just as TAC
has done, jurisdictions may have to limit the TAC model to a small
subset of “high risk” batterers to overcome the “sticky norm” and
limited resources problems.
The problem of “sticky norms” exists when the “prevalence of a
social norm makes decisionmakers reluctant to carry out a law
intended to change that norm.”332 In other words, if a law condemns
a norm that is socially acceptable, the police are going to be reluctant
to arrest individuals who break that law, and prosecutors are going
to be reluctant to charge the individuals with crimes.333 As a result,
the law is not enforced, and the social norm does not change.334 In
addition, making the law harsher only exacerbates the reluctance of
legal actors.335
In order to change social norms through the law, Dan Kahan
advocates for “gentle nudges.”336 He argues that if the law
condemns behavior only slightly, the typical decisionmaker will want
to discharge her civic duty, will override her reluctance to condemn
the law, and will ultimately enforce the law.337 Following her
331. In 2003, it was reported that TAC only took about 1920 cases per year. JANE M.
SADUSKY, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUST. PROJECT CRIM. JUST. CENTER, COMMUNITY POLICING
& DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FIVE PROMISING PRACTICES 31 (2003), http://data.ipharos.com/
bwjp/documents/COPS%20DV%20Monograph%20Rev%20Aug04.pdf. This number was far
below the almost 70,000 cases of domestic violence cases reported in Chicago that year. Id. It
should be noted that funding from government grants for TAC has been reduced since the
program’s inception. Ford, supra note 314.
332. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges v. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000).
333. Id. at 607–08.
334. Id. at 608.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 608. See also RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, & HAPPINESS (Caravan 2008).
337. Id.
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example, other decisionmakers will also enforce the law.338 Once this
enforcement becomes common practice, lawmakers can then increase
the degree of condemnation by a little more.339
Within the domestic violence context, Kahan notes that domestic
violence laws condemn the social norm of occasional violence.340 He
suggests shaming and civil and contempt remedies as initial gentle
nudges to encourage decisionmakers to enforce domestic violence
laws.341 He also discusses the use of specialized departments that will
enforce domestic violence laws; these departments can be comprised
of decisionmakers who specifically believe in enforcing these laws.342
The social norm of occasional violence may be waning due to the
mandatory policies that have been in place over the last several years.
Victimless prosecutions, however, have become common practice,
and there may be the sticky norm or belief that domestic violence
victims cannot and will not testify. Domestic violence victims believe
this norm and so do legal actors. Legal actors, therefore, will be
resistant to a program that they may view as futile and as a waste of
limited time and resources. For this reason, I realize that many legal
actors are going to try to fit as many out-of-court statements as
possible under Davis’ definition of a testimonial statement.
Related to the “sticky norm” problem is the fact that
jurisdictions have limited resources. Although VAWA 2005
reauthorized more funding for grants that may be able to support
programs similar to TAC,343 the Act did not actually fund these
grants; it is up to Congress to appropriate funding in its budget each
year for similar state-run programs. Furthermore, it is doubtful that
the amount authorized under VAWA 2005 will be enough. In
addition, state and local funding will be limited in most jurisdictions.
For these reasons, it cannot be overemphasized how limited
resources are likely to still be an obstacle to creating inclusive
programs like TAC within the foreseeable future. In addition, it may
be the case that not all cases can or should be handled by the
criminal justice system because of limited resources and because it
may not in the best interest of every victim to pursue a resolution
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 628–29.
341. Id. at 630.
342. Id. at 629–30.
343. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109–162, 119 Stat. 2960.
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through prosecution. Jurisdictions might have to determine which
cases are most appropriately handled through prosecution and
allocate their resources accordingly.
For these reasons, the gentle nudge that this Article proposes in
response to these sticky norm and limited resource problems is, just
as TAC has done, limiting the use of this model to a small subset of
victims of “high risk” batterers. In cases where victims are in greater
danger, perhaps legal actors will have an incentive to keep in more
constant contact with them, to provide them with more protection,
and to press forward with prosecution to make sure that the batterer
gets off of the street. Limiting the caseload to “high risk” offenders
may also make more individualized attention to the victims less
taxing on the prosecutor’s time and resources. Finally, jurisdictions
that are able to create a specialized department like TAC may be able
to hand pick individuals who are committed to creating more of a
partnership between domestic violence victims and the criminal
justice system. If this limited model is successful in encouraging
more victim participation, legal actors may themselves advocate for
more resources to expand the model to more victims. Yet, even if
jurisdictions do not expand this model to more victims, increasing
the participation of at least some domestic violence victims is a
significant step away from victim silence.
CONCLUSION
Participants in the women’s movement originally were concerned
about domestic violence because its proponents wanted women to
be physically, mentally, and emotionally safe and because they
believed that domestic violence was a symptom of the legal and
political subordination women suffered both inside and outside of
the home. Frustrated that the criminal justice system was largely
ignoring this problem, they lobbied for an institutional response. As
a result of these efforts, states have made significant changes in
domestic violence criminal laws and policies.
Under mandatory arrest and prosecution policies, however, there
is a danger that the criminal justice system will focus on increasing
the number of arrests and prosecutions of domestic violence
perpetrators and not on the goals of safety, gender equality, and
autonomy. While victimless prosecutions empower prosecutors to
increase the number of perpetrators prosecuted, it is questionable as
to whether a nondiscriminatory use of this practice is effective in
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meeting the original goals of the women’s movement. It is not clear
that all women are safer when they do not testify or participate in the
prosecution of their batterers. Given this fact, victimless prosecutions
may be problematic because they encourage the silence of women,
and speech is an important tool of political and legal empowerment.
Given the potential harm of some victimless prosecutions and the
effects of Crawford and Davis on this practice, it seems wise to
consider the benefits of increased victim participation. While there
may be circumstances where victimless prosecutions are necessary in
the domestic violence context, there are many circumstances where
victims can and should participate in the prosecution process.
Chicago’s TAC program is one model that suggests that victim
participation is possible.
Because of limited resources and the skepticism that many
victims and legal actors may have that victims can and will testify,
many jurisdictions may have to take small steps in implementing this
type of model. One such step could be focusing on the victims of
high-risk offenders. In jurisdictions that do implement this model,
there will, of course, still be those women who will not want to
participate in the prosecution of their batterers. Indeed, there may be
victims who will never contact the criminal justice system at all
because they are afraid of testifying. There will also be women whose
best interest is not served by testifying or by following through with
the prosecution. For these reasons, my proposal for a more inclusive
approach is not a panacea for domestic violence, and other solutions
both inside and outside of the criminal justice system are also
necessary in stemming this problem. Nevertheless, with respect to
the criminal justice system, I encourage scholars to consider whether
increased victim participation is a better long-term solution to
domestic violence than silence.
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